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Abstract 
A fundamental question in monopolistic competition theory is whether the market allocates resources 
efficiently.  This  paper  generalizes  the  Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz  framework  to  heterogeneous  firms, 
addressing when the market provides optimal quantities, variety and productivity. Under constant 
elasticity  demand,  each  firm  prices  above  its  average  cost,  yet  we  show  market  allocations  are 
efficient. When demand elasticities vary, market allocations are not efficient and reflect the distortions 
of imperfect competition. After determining the nature of market distortions, we investigate how 
integration may serve as a remedy to imperfect competition. Both market distortions and the impact of 
integration depend on two demand side elasticities, and we suggest richer demand structures to pin 
down  these  elasticities.  We  also  show  that  integration  eliminates  distortions,  provided  the  post-
integration market is sufficiently large. 
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Empirical work has drawn attention to the high degree of heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity and the
impact of market integration on ﬁrm survival and markups (Bernard et al. 2007, Feenstra 2006).
The introduction of ﬁrm heterogeneity in monopolistic competition models has provided new in-
sights into the reallocation of resources within industries. A fundamental question within this
setting is whether the market allocates resources efﬁciently. Symmetric ﬁrm models explain when
market allocations are efﬁcient by examining the trade off between quantity and product variety.
When ﬁrms are heterogeneous in productivity, we must also ask which types of ﬁrms should pro-
duce and which should be shut down. This paper examines how ﬁrm heterogeneity affects market
efﬁciency. We focus on three key questions. First, does the market allocate resources efﬁciently?
Second, whatisthenatureofdistortions, ifany? Third, caneconomicintegrationreducedistortions
through increased competition?
We answer these questions in the standard setting of a monopolistically competitive industry
with heterogeneous productivity draws and free entry (e.g. Melitz 2003). Empirical work shows
that ﬁrms are rarely symmetric and markups are unlikely to be constant.1 To allow rich interrela-
tionships between productivity, markups and efﬁciency, we focus on the general class of variable
elasticity demand systems, considered by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). When demand elasticities vary
with quantity and ﬁrms vary in productivity, markups will vary within a market. Heterogeneous
markups give rise to a range of possible market distortions which would not arise if ﬁrms were
symmetric or charged constant markups.
Differences in productivity across ﬁrms change optimal allocation decisions in a fundamental
way. In symmetric ﬁrm models, marginal cost pricing and average cost pricing serve as heuristics
for ﬁrst-best and second-best resource allocations. In heterogeneous ﬁrm models, inducing each
ﬁrm to price at its marginal cost or average cost will not maximize welfare because neither scheme
takes into account sunk entry costs and the effect of heterogeneity on resource costs. Thus, differ-
ent levels of production maximize welfare than what marginal or average cost pricing imply. For
example, it could be welfare-improving to skew resources towards ﬁrms with lower costs (to con-
serve resources) or towards ﬁrms with higher costs (to preserve variety). The relative position of
a ﬁrm in the cost distribution matters, and incorporating differences in ﬁrm costs can alter welfare
and policy analysis substantially.
As a heterogeneous cost environment presents information problems for policy, one potential
tool to improve efﬁciency is to integrate with international markets. For instance, the distortions of
imperfect competition may be mitigated with increased competition from foreign ﬁrms, implying
that integration provides opportunities to correct market failure. This idea of welfare gains from
1CES demand provides a useful benchmark by forcing constant markups that ensure market size plays no role in
productivity changes. However, recent studies ﬁnd market size matters for ﬁrm size (Campbell and Hopenhayn 2005)
and productivity dispersion (Syverson 2004). Foster et al. (2008) show that “proﬁtability” rather than productivity is
more important for ﬁrm selection, suggesting a role for richer demand speciﬁcations.
2mitigating distortions goes back to at least Melvin et al. (1973). Building on this insight, we model
international integration as access to new markets and examine whether it can be a policy tool to
correct distortions.2
Starting with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand, we show that when ﬁrms vary
in productivity, market allocations are efﬁcient but ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts. This result seems
surprising, based on the logic of marginal or average cost pricing which is designed to return pro-
ducer surplus to consumers. With productivity differences, the market requires prices above aver-
age costs to induce ﬁrms to enter and potentially take a loss. Free entry ensures the wedge between
prices and average costs exactly ﬁnances sunk entry costs. Therefore, the market implements the
ﬁrst-best allocation and laissez faire industrial policy is optimal.3
How broadly does this efﬁciency result hold? We generalize the demand structure to the vari-
able elasticity of substitution (VES) form of Dixit and Stiglitz which provides a rich setting for a
wide range of market outcomes (Spence 1976; Vives 2001; Zhelobodko et al. 2011). Within this
setting, market efﬁciency is unique to CES demand. While the market does maximize real revenue,
private beneﬁts to ﬁrms are perfectly aligned with social beneﬁts only under CES demand.
The nature of distortions under VES demand can be determined by two demand side elastic-
ities: the inverse demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility. Misalignment of these elasticities
determines the bias in market allocations relative to optimal allocations. This is in sharp contrast
to symmetric ﬁrm models where the elasticity of utility is enough to determine this bias in mar-
ket allocations across quantity and variety. When ﬁrms are heterogeneous, the market allocates
resources across different types of ﬁrms and the variable elasticity of demand shapes the distribu-
tion of quantities produced. This distinguishes distortions in heterogeneous ﬁrm markets in two
respects. First, some ﬁrms may over-produce while others under-produce within the same market.
This shifts the focus from a general level of production to the distribution of production. Second,
the distribution of variable markups affects ﬁrm entry, and aggregate quantity and variety now de-
pend on both the elasticity of utility and the elasticity of demand. This alters how one thinks about
the trade-off between aggregate quantity versus variety.
Integration with international markets can potentially mitigate distortions across the distribu-
tion of ﬁrms. To capture the role integration as a policy tool, we ﬁrst examine the effects of
integration with large markets. Such integration will push outcomes towards what we deﬁne as the
monopolistically competitive limit, which eliminates distortions. In this limit ﬁrm heterogeneity
and market power persist, but market size is so large that the quantity sold from a ﬁrm to each
2International integration is equivalent to an expansion in market size (e.g., Krugman 1979). As our focus is on
efﬁciency, we abstract from trade frictions which introduce cross-country distributional issues.
3Melitz (2003) considers both variable and ﬁxed costs of exporting. We show that the open Melitz economy is
efﬁcient, even in the presence of trade frictions. In the presence of ﬁxed export costs, the ﬁrms a policymaker would
close down in the open economy are exactly those that would not survive in the market. However, a policymaker would
not close down ﬁrms in the absence of export costs. Thus, the rise in productivity following trade provides welfare
gains by optimally internalizing trade frictions. Market allocations are efﬁcient even with asymmetric countries, but
the presence of trade frictions introduces distributional concerns which we do not address.
3worker is negligible. Most importantly, VES demand operates much like CES demand, and mar-
ket allocations are efﬁcient. This shows that competition can eliminate distortions while retaining
the characteristics of markets with heterogeneous ﬁrms who possess market power. Markups be-
come constant across ﬁrms, so CES demand might approximate richer demand structures in large
economies. However, the monopolistically competitive limit may require a market size which is
unattainable even in fully integrated world markets.
Integration with small markets has different effects than integration with large markets. In
small markets, heterogeneous markups lead to distortions and small increases in market size may
increase welfare, but fail to reduce distortions. We illustrate this with the impact of integration
on productivity distortions in small markets. Under VES demand, changes in market produc-
tivity depend on the inverse demand elasticity, while changes in optimal productivity depend on
the elasticity of utility. A comparison of these elasticities determines how integration affects the
gap between market productivity and optimal productivity. When these elasticities are aligned,
distortions dissipate. However, when the elasticities are misaligned, integration can exacerbate
distortions. This implies that integration may increase the scope for policies that anticipate how
integration will alter production in imperfect markets. In this regard, estimation of richer demand
structures becomes imperative in understanding how integration impacts market distortions. Our
last results provide suggestions about how to assess distortions empirically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates this paper to previous work and Section
3 recaps trade models with ﬁrm heterogeneity. Section 4 presents efﬁciency results in a closed
economy. Section 5 introduces international trade and contrasts the efﬁciency of CES demand
with inefﬁciency of VES demand, also deriving a monopolistically competitive limit which shows
how integration can eliminate distortions. Section 6 characterizes the nature of static distortions
and further analyzes the impact of integration on distortions. Section 7 gathers together some
theoretical implications useful for designing empirical strategies and Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Work
Our paper is related to work on welfare gains in industrial organization and international eco-
nomics. The trade off between variety and quantity occupies a prominent place in the industrial
organization literature (e.g., Mankiw and Whinston 1986). We contribute to this literature by
studying the effects of ﬁrm heterogeneity and international trade. The analysis is motivated by
efﬁciency properties which have been studied at length in symmetric ﬁrm models of monopolistic
competition.4 Recently, Bilbiie et al. (2006) show the market equilibrium with symmetric ﬁrms
is socially optimal if and only if preferences are CES. We generalize the result to heterogeneous
ﬁrms and show that efﬁciency is unrelated to the productivity distribution of ﬁrms. To the best of
4Spence (1976); Dixit and Stiglitz (1977); Venables (1985); Bilbiie et al. (2006); Behrens and Murata (2009).
4our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to show market outcomes in Melitz are ﬁrst best.5
To highlight the potential scope of market imperfections, we generalize the well known CES
demand structure to VES demand. In contemporaneous work, Zhelobodko et al. (2011) develop
complementary results for market outcomes under VES demand and demonstrate its richness and
tractability under various assumptions such as multiple sectors and vertical differentiation. Unlike
Zhelobodko et al., our focus is on market efﬁciency.
We also study the limiting behavior of a VES economy. A large literature examines whether
monopolistic competition arises as a limit to oligopolistic pricing and when monopolistic compe-
tition converges to perfect competition in symmetric ﬁrm models (Vives 2001, Chapter 6). This
literature considers the limiting behavior as the number of ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity. Instead, we ex-
amine a monopolistically competitive model with a continuum of ﬁrms so there are inﬁnitely many
ﬁrms even in an economy with ﬁnite market size. After establishing the equivalence of increased
international trade and increased market size, we study the limiting behavior in terms of the model
primitive of market size becoming large.
The ﬁndings of our paper are related to an emerging literature on welfare gains in new trade
models. Generalizing Krugman (1980) to heterogeneous ﬁrms, Melitz shows that opening to trade
raises welfare through reallocation of resources towards high productivity ﬁrms. Considering 48
countries exporting to the US in 1980-2000, Feenstra and Kee (2008) estimate that rise in export
variety accounts for an average 3.3 per cent rise in productivity and GDP for the exporting country.
In recent inﬂuential work, Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming) show that the mapping between trade
data and welfare is the same across several old and new trade models with different production
structures. This equivalence holds for models which permit welfare to be summarized by import
shares and trade elasticities (that can be derived from gravity equations). Once the Spence-Dixit-
Stiglitz demand framework is considered, we ﬁnd welfare inferences from import shares require
additional information about demand and become more structural in nature. Unlike Arkolakis
et al., we focus on market efﬁciency and show that the potential gains from integration are larger
because of the opportunity to reduce distortions.
Our results speak directly to the mixed ﬁndings about trade liberalization and productivity in
the empirical literature. Following trade liberalization, some countries show a reallocation towards
high productivity ﬁrms while others show a reallocation towards low productivity ﬁrms.6 Tybout
5We consider this to be the proof of a folk theorem. The idea of efﬁciency in Melitz has been “in the air.” Within
the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) and Feenstra and Kee (2008) discuss certain
efﬁciency properties of the Melitz economy. In their working paper, Atkeson and Burstein (2010) consider a ﬁrst
order approximation and numerical exercises to show that productivity increases are offset by reductions in variety.
We provide an analytical treatment to show the market equilibrium implements the unconstrained social optimum.
Helpmanetal.(2011)considertheconstrainedsocialoptimuminthepresenceofahomogeneousgood. Theirapproach
differs because the homogeneous good ﬁxes the marginal utility of income.
6Interpreting ﬁrm size as productivity, Tybout (2003) notes that it was the high productivity ﬁrms that lost market
share in Chile and Colombia while it was the low productivity ﬁrms that suffered a decline in Morocco. While
productivity estimation is fraught with difﬁculties in measuring technical efﬁciency, we focus on the relationship
between productivity and welfare as in the heterogeneous ﬁrm literature.
5(2003) proposes that these mixed ﬁndings could mean that the selection effects emphasized by
Melitz are not robust, or that ﬁrm size is a poor proxy for productivity. We address the ﬁrst issue
by examining the robustness of selection effects to general demand speciﬁcations. Differences
in inverse demand elasticities induce different patterns of ﬁrm selection, reconciling the mixed
evidence for productivity changes across heterogeneous ﬁrms. The second issue of productivity
measurementhasbeenaddressedinseveralstudies. Insteadofmeasurement, wefocusonhowVES
demand can better explain observed patterns. As both observed markups and physical productivity
vary with market size under general demand speciﬁcations, our ﬁndings reiterate the importance of
disentangling changes in markups and productivity to understand the sources of welfare gains from
trade. We characterize when observed productivity gains reﬂect a narrowing of the distortionary
gap between market and optimal productivity. Therefore, our work is in line with Tybout (2003)
and Katayama et al. (2009) who point to the limitations of the empirical literature in mapping
observed productivity gains to welfare and optimal policies.
3 Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms
Trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms differ from earlier trade models with product differenti-
ation in two signiﬁcant ways. First, costs of production are unknown to ﬁrms before sunk costs
of entry are incurred. Second, ﬁrms are asymmetric in their costs of production, leading to ﬁrm
selection based on productivity. In this section we brieﬂy recap the implications of asymmetric
costs for consumers, ﬁrms and equilibrium outcomes.
3.1 Consumers
A mass L of identical consumers in an economy are each endowed with one unit of labor and
face a wage rate w normalized to one. Preferences are identical across all consumers in home and
foreign countries. Let Me denote the mass of entering varieties and q(c) denote quantity consumed
of variety c by each consumer. A consumer has preferences over differentiated goods U(Me;q)




Here u denotes utility from an individual variety and
R
u(q)dG denotes utility from a unit bundle of
differentiated varieties. In a Melitz economy, preferences take the special CES form with u(q) =
qr.7 More generally, we assume preferences satisfy usual regularity conditions which guarantee
well deﬁned consumer and ﬁrm problems.





1=r but the normalization of the exponent 1=r
in Equation (1) will not play a role in allocation decisions.
6Deﬁnition 1. (Regular Preferences) u satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. u(0) is normalized to zero.
2. u is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave.
3. (u0(q)q)
0 is strictly decreasing in quantity.
4. The elasticity of marginal utility m(q)  jqu00(q)=u0(q)j is less than one.
For each good indexed by c, VES preferences induce an inverse demand p(q(c)) = u0(q(c))=d
where d is a consumer’s budget multiplier. As u is strictly increasing and concave, for any ﬁxed
price vector the consumer’s maximization problem is concave. The necessary condition which
determines the inverse demand is sufﬁcient, and has a solution provided inada conditions on u.8
Multiplying both sides of the inverse demand by q(c) and aggregating over all c, the budget multi-




There is a continuum of ﬁrms which may enter the market for differentiated goods, by paying a
sunk entry cost of fe. Each ﬁrm produces a single variety so the mass of entering ﬁrms is the mass
of entering varieties Me. Upon entry, each ﬁrm receives a unit cost c drawn from a distribution G
with continuously differentiable pdf g.9
After entry, should a ﬁrm produce for the domestic market it faces a cost function TC(q(c)) 
cq(c)+ f where f denotes the ﬁxed cost of production. Each ﬁrm faces an inverse demand of
p(q(c)) = u0(q(c))=d and acts as a monopolist of variety c. Post entry proﬁt of the ﬁrm from
domestic sales is p(c) where p(c)  maxq(c)[p(q(c)) c]q(c)L  f. The regularity conditions
guarantee the monopolist’s FOC is optimal and the quantity choice is given by
p+qu00(q)=d = c: (MR=MC)
MR=MC ensuresthatthemarkuprateis(p(c) c)=p(c)= qu00(q)=u0(q)= m(q(c)). Therefore,
theelasticityofmarginalutilitysummarizestheinversedemandelasticityas m(q)jqu00(q)=u0(q)j=
jdlnp(q)=dlnqj.
When the economy opens to trade, ﬁrms incur an iceberg transport cost t  1 and a ﬁxed cost
fx  0 in order to export to other countries. As a result, ﬁrms face a cost function TC(qx(c)) 
tcqx(c)+ fx and a demand function p(qx(c)) for sales to the export market. Proﬁt from foreign
sales is px(c)  maxqx(c)[p(qx(c)) tc]qx(c)L  fx and the optimal qx choice is given by a similar
MR = MC condition.
8Utility functions not satisfying inada conditions are permissible but may require parametric restrictions to ensure
existence. We will assume inada conditions on utility and revenue, though they are not necessary for all results.
9Some additional regularity conditions on G are required for existence of a market equilibrium in Melitz.
73.3 Market equilibrium
Proﬁt maximization implies that ﬁrms produce for the domestic and/or export markets if they
can earn non-negative proﬁts from sales in the domestic and/or export markets, respectively. We
denote the cutoff cost level of ﬁrms that are indifferent between producing and exiting from the
domestic market as ca in autarky and cd in the open economy. The cutoff cost level for ﬁrms
indifferent between exporting and not producing for the export market is denoted by cx. Formally,
let i = a;d;x denote autarky and the domestic and export markets of the open home economy
respectively. Each ci is ﬁxed by the Zero Proﬁt Condition (ZPC),
pi(ci) = 0 for i = a;d;x: (ZPC)
Since ﬁrms with cost draws higher than the cutoff level do not produce, the mass of domestic
producers (Mi) supplying to market i is Mi = MeG(ci).
In summary, each ﬁrm faces a two stage problem: in the second stage it maximizes proﬁts from
domestic and export sales given a known cost draw, and in the ﬁrst stage it decides whether to
enter given the expected proﬁts in the second stage. We maintain the standard free entry condition
imposed in monopolistic competition models. Speciﬁcally, let P(c) denote the total expected proﬁt
from sales in all markets for a ﬁrm with cost draw c, then ex ante average P net of sunk entry costs
must be zero, Z
P(c)dG = fe: (FE)
The next two Sections examine the efﬁciency properties of this framework for closed and open
economies.
4 Efﬁciency in the Closed Economy
Having described an economy consisting of heterogeneous imperfectly competitive ﬁrms, we now
examine efﬁciency of market allocations in the closed economy. Outside of cases in which im-
perfect competition leads to competitive outcomes with zero proﬁts, one would generally expect
the coexistence of positive markups and positive proﬁts to indicate inefﬁciency through loss of
consumer surplus. Nonetheless, this Section shows that CES demand combined with the Melitz
production framework exhibits positive markups and proﬁts for surviving ﬁrms, yet it is allocation-
ally efﬁcient. However, we also show that the usual relationship between imperfect competition
and welfare, that private incentives are not aligned with optimal production patterns, is true for all
VES demand structures except CES.
84.1 Welfare under isoelastic demand
In a closed economy, a policymaker maximizes individual welfare U as given in Equation (1).10
The policymaker is unconstrained and chooses the mass of entrants, quantities and which ﬁrms of
various productivities produce. At the optimum, zero quantities will be chosen for varieties above
a cost threshold ca. Therefore, all optimal allocative decisions can be summarized by quantity
q(c), potential variety Me and productivity ca. Our approach for arriving at the optimal allocation
is to think of optimal quantities qopt(c) as being determined implicitly by ca and Me so that per





After solving for each qopt conditional on ca and Me, Equation (2) can be maximized in ca and Me.
Proposition 1 shows the market provides the ﬁrst-best quantity, variety and productivity.
Proposition 1. Every market equilibrium of a closed Melitz economy is socially optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Proposition 1 differs from standard symmetric ﬁrm monopolistic competition
results because optimal quantity is a nontrivial function of unit cost, variety and cutoff productivity.
Astheproofisinvolved, werelegatedetailstotheAppendixanddiscusstherationaleforoptimality
below.
In symmetric ﬁrm models, we know that ﬁrms charge positive markups which result in lower
quantities than those implied by marginal cost pricing. However, the markup is constant so the
market price (and hence marginal utility) is proportional to unit cost, ensuring proportionate re-
duction in quantity from the level that would be observed under marginal cost pricing (Baumol
and Bradford 1970). Moreover, homogeneous ﬁrms choose price equal to average cost so the
proﬁt exactly ﬁnances the ﬁxed cost of production. Each ﬁrm therefore internalizes the effect of
higher variety on consumer surplus, resulting in an efﬁcient market equilibrium (Grossman and
Helpman 1993, Bilbiie et al. 2006).
With heterogeneous ﬁrms, markups continue to be constant, ensuring that market prices across
ﬁrms are proportionate to unit costs. But, average cost pricing is too low to compensate ﬁrms
for an efﬁcient allocation, because it will not cover ex ante entry costs. The market ensures that
surviving ﬁrms internalize the losses faced by exiting ﬁrms, losses which are determined by aggre-
gate economic demand that depends on q(c), ca and Me. Post entry, surviving ﬁrms charge prices
higher than average costs (p(c)  [cq(c)+ f=L]=q(c)) which compensates them for the possibility
of paying fe to enter and then being too unproductive to survive. CES demand ensures that ca and
Me are at optimal levels that ﬁx p(ca), thereby ﬁxing absolute prices to optimal levels.
10Free entry implies zero expected proﬁts so the focus is on consumer surplus.
9The way in which CES preferences cause ﬁrms to optimally internalize aggregate economic
conditions can be made clear by deﬁning the elasticity of utility e(q)  qu0(q)=u(q) and the social
markup 1 e(q). We term 1 e(q) the social markup because at the optimal allocation, it denotes
the utility from consumption of a variety net of its resource cost. At the optimal allocation, there is
a multiplier l which encapsulates the shadow cost of labor and ensures u0(q(c)) = lc. Therefore,
the social markup is
1 e(q) =1 u0(q)=u(q) =(u(q) lcq)=u(q): (Social Markup)
For any optimal allocation, a quantity that maximizes social beneﬁt from variety c solves
max
q(c)






In contrast, the incentives that ﬁrms face in the market are
max
q(c)




Since e and m depend only on the primitive u(q), we can examine which preferences would make
ﬁrms choose optimal quantities. Clearly, if m(q)=(1 m(q)) is proportional to (1 e(q))=e(q),
ﬁrms will choose optimal quantities q when they produce, but the set of producers might be smaller
or larger than optimal, depending on which ﬁrms can make enough proﬁts to clear the ﬁxed cost f.
For the market to also select the optimal range of productivity, m(q)=(1 m(q)) must not only be
proportional to (1 e(q))=e(q), but in fact be the same. Examining CES demand, we see precisely
that m(q)=(1 m(q))=(1 e(q))=e(q) for all q. Thus, CES demand incentivizes exactly the right
ﬁrms to produce, in addition to producing optimal quantities.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that laissez faire industrial policy is optimal under CES
demand. This efﬁciency result may seem surprising in the context of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who
ﬁnd that market allocations are second-best but not ﬁrst-best under CES demand for differentiated
goods. Dixit and Stiglitz consider two sectors (a homogeneous goods sector and a differentiated
goods sector) and assume a general utility function to aggregate across these goods. With a general
utility function, the elasticity of substitution between the homogeneous and differentiated goods
is not constant, leading to inefﬁcient market allocations. In the next subsection, we examine the
role of elasticities in greater detail. In keeping with Melitz, we consider a single sector to develop
results for market efﬁciency in terms of elasticities.
104.2 Welfare beyond isoelastic demand
Efﬁciency of the market equilibrium in a Melitz economy is tied to CES demand. To highlight
the role of CES demand, we consider the general class of variable elasticity of substitution (VES)
demand studied by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) as speciﬁed in Equation (1). With regard to efﬁciency,
comparison of FOCs for the market and optimal allocation shows constant markups are necessary
for efﬁciency. Therefore, within the VES class, optimality of market allocations is unique to CES
preferences.11
Proposition 2. Under VES demand, a necessary condition for the market equilibrium to be so-
cially optimal is that u is CES.12
Proof. Proof available upon request.
Under general VES demand, market allocations are not efﬁcient and do not maximize indi-
vidual welfare. Proposition 3 shows that the market instead maximizes aggregate real revenue
(Me
R
u0(q(c))q(c)LdG) generated in the economy.
Proposition 3. Under VES demand, the market maximizes aggregate real revenue in the closed
economy.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that market resource allocation is generally not aligned with the social



















For CES demand, u(q) = qr while u0(q)q = rqr implying revenue maximization is perfectly
aligned with welfare maximization. Outside of CES, quantities produced by ﬁrms are too low
or too high and in general equilibrium, this implies the average productivity of operating ﬁrms is
also too low or too high. Market quantity, variety and productivity reﬂect distortions of imperfect
11VES utility is additively separable and therefore does not include the quadratic utility of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) and the translog utility of Feenstra (2003). However, Zhelobodko et al. (2011) show VES demand captures the
qualitative features of market outcomes obtained under these forms of non-additive utility.
12For completeness, we note that constant elasticities of demand are necessary but not sufﬁcient for optimal-
ity of market allocations. We extend the CES demand of Melitz to CES-Benassy preferences U(Me;ca;q) 
n(Me)
R cd
0 q(c)rg(c)dc. In this example, u is CES but varieties and the unit bundle are valued differently through
n(Me). Market allocations under CES-Benassy preferences are the same as with CES preferences of Melitz. However,
ﬁrms do not fully internalize consumers’ taste for variety, leading to suboptimal levels of quantity, variety and pro-
ductivity. Following Benassy (1996), Bilbiie et al. (2006) and Alessandria and Choi (2007), when n(Me) = M
r(nB+1)
e ,
these preferences disentangle “taste for variety” nB from the markup to cost ratio (1 r)=r. Market allocations are
optimal only if taste for variety exactly equals the markup to cost ratio (nB = (1 r)=r).
11competition, and therefore, increased competition through opening markets to trade might improve
efﬁciency. This leads us to an examination of the impact of trade on market distortions.
5 Efﬁciency in an Open Economy
Motivated by empirical studies of ﬁrm heterogeneity, Melitz (2003) shows that reallocation of re-
sources towards high productivity ﬁrms provides a new source of gains from trade. In this Section,
we examine how international trade affects market and optimal allocations in a Melitz economy.
We start by showing that CES demand continues to induce efﬁcient allocations in an open econ-
omy. Under VES demand, market allocations are suboptimal so we examine when market expan-
sion from trade eventually mitigates the distortions of imperfect competition while preserving ﬁrm
heterogeneity.
5.1 Welfare under isoelastic demand
Trade provides productivity gains by reallocating resources towards low cost ﬁrms, and increased
productivity is gained at the expense of variety. One might therefore expect artiﬁcially selecting
lowcostﬁrmstoproducewouldimprovewelfareinautarky. Infact, thisisnotthecase. Proposition
1 shows that the autarkic market equilibrium is efﬁcient. This implies that the open economy
productivitylevelisundesirableinautarkyasitgeneratestoolittlevariety. However, asProposition
4 below shows, the productivity level selected in an open economy is efﬁcient. Thus trade itself
makes a new mix of productivity and variety efﬁcient.
Proposition 4. Every market equilibrium of identical open Melitz economies is socially optimal.
Proof. See Appendix.
Why is the higher productivity level of the open economy inefﬁcient in autarky? Proposition
4 implies that market selection of ﬁrms is optimal if an increase in size can only be attained at
a cost of exogenous frictions (t; fx). Compared to a frictionless world, trade frictions reduce the
potential welfare gains from trade. The market minimizes the losses from frictions by weeding out
high cost ﬁrms. Conditional on trade costs, market selection of ﬁrms is optimal and provides a net
welfare gain from trade.
Proposition 4 is striking in that the differences in ﬁrm costs do not generate inefﬁciencies de-
spite heterogeneity of proﬁts and the different effects that trade frictions will have on ﬁrm behavior.
Furthermore, selection of ﬁrms performs the function of allocating additional resources optimally
without any informational requirements. Under CES demand, laissez faire industrial policy is
optimal for the world economy.13
13However, terms of trade externalities may exist and lead to a breakdown of laissez faire policies. Demidova and
12Modeling trade between equally sized countries makes the role of trade frictions extremely
clear cut. When countries differ in size, trade frictions introduce cross-country distributional issues
which obscure the pure efﬁciency question. Speciﬁcally, consider two countries of different sizes
with cost distribution G(c) = (c=cmax)
k and CES demand. Market allocations are efﬁcient when
these countries trade with each other and face no trade frictions. These market allocations max-
imize social welfare with equal Pareto weights assigned to every individual in the two countries.
Introducing trade frictions will continue to induce efﬁcient market allocations, but with unequal
Pareto weights. This shows the market is implicitly favoring certain consumers, so that ﬁrm selec-
tion patterns reﬂect distributional outcomes in addition to cost competitiveness. The cross-country
distribution of welfare gains is important but beyond the focus of this study. In what follows, we
wish to study efﬁciency rather than distribution so we model the stylized case of frictionless trade
and consider more general demand structures which can explain a greater range of trade effects.
5.2 Welfare beyond isoelastic demand
This subsection examines market distortions in an open economy with variable elasticities. We
abstract from trade costs to focus on efﬁciency rather than distributional issues. The market equi-
librium between freely trading countries of sizes L1;:::;Ln is identical to the market equilibrium
of a single autarkic country of size L = L1 +:::+Ln. Thus, opening to trade is equivalent to an
increase in market size, echoing Krugman (1979). This result is summarized as Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the absence of trade costs, trade between countries of sizes L1;:::;Ln has the
same market outcome as a uniﬁed market of size L = L1+:::+Ln.
Proof. Available upon request, see also Krugman (1979).
Proposition 5 allows us to think about increased trade as an increase in market size L of a closed
economy. An increase in market size has the identical effect of increased competition which will
impact efﬁciency by altering market distortions. We turn to efﬁciency properties of the open VES
economy, and investigate how far increased competition from trade can go towards improving
market outcomes.
5.2.1 Market Efﬁciency under VES Demand
Having established that opening to trade is equivalent to an increase in the size of a VES economy,
we can follow the same reasoning as in the closed VES economy to infer that market allocations
in an open economy are suboptimal. Marginal revenues do not correspond to marginal utilities so
market allocations are not aligned with efﬁcient allocations. This is particularly important when
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) incorporate terms of trade considerations and provide domestic policies to obtain the ﬁrst-best
allocation in an open Melitz economy with Pareto cost draws. Chor (2009) also considers when policy intervention is
appropriate in a heterogeneous ﬁrm model with multinationals and a homogeneous goods sector.
13considering trade as a policy option, as it implies that opening to trade may take the economy
further from the social optimum. For example, market expansion from trade may induce exit of
low productivity ﬁrms from the market when it is optimal to keep more low productivity ﬁrms with
the purpose of preserving variety.
So when does integration mitigate or exacerbate distortions? As acknowledged by Spence,
“perfectly general propositions are hard to come by” and the nature of distortions can be highly
dependent on parameter magnitudes. To make progress, we follow Stiglitz (1986) and ﬁrst study
market and optimal outcomes as market size becomes arbitrarily large. This allows us to examine
when international trade enables markets to eventually mitigate distortions. Later, we also examine
distortions in small markets.
5.2.2 Market Efﬁciency in Large Markets
Looking at efﬁciency in large markets explains whether integrating with world markets enables a
small economy to overcome its market distortions. From a theoretical perspective we will term a
large market the limit of the economy as the mass of workers L approaches inﬁnity, and in practice
we might expect that sufﬁciently large markets approximate this limiting case.14
The large economy concept is similar in spirit to the idea of a competitive limit, in that the
number of entrants grows unboundedly large while the quantity supplied from each ﬁrm to each
worker becomes small. However, when ﬁrms are heterogeneous, simply knowing there are a large
number of entrants does not explain the distribution of productivity, prices and quantity. At least
three salient outcomes can occur. One outcome is that competitive pressures might weed out all
ﬁrms but the most productive. This occurs for instance when marginal revenue is bounded, as
when u is quadratic or CARA (constant absolute risk aversion).15 It may also happen that access
to large markets allows even the least productive ﬁrms to amortize ﬁxed costs and produce. To
retain the fundamental properties of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous ﬁrms, we chart
out a third possibility between these two extremes: some, but not all, ﬁrms produce. To do so, we
maintain the previous regularity conditions for a market equilibrium. In order to aid the analysis,
we make three assumptions on demand at small quantities. The ﬁrst assumption enables a clear
distinction between the three salient outcomes in large markets.
Assumption(InteriorMarkups). Theinversedemandelasticityandelasticityofutilityarebounded





The assumption of interior markups guarantees that as the quantity sold from a ﬁrm to a
consumer becomes small (as happens for all positive unit cost ﬁrms), markups remain positive
(m > 0) and prices remain bounded (m < 1). It also guarantees that the added utility provided
14How large markets need to be to justify this approximation is an open quantitative question.
15See Behrens and Murata (2009).
14per labor unit at the optimum converges to a non-zero constant (e.g., Solow 1998).16 An ex-




]=a for r 2 (0;1). It nests the CES for a = 0.17 When markups are
interior, there is a sharp taxonomy of what may happen to the distribution of costs, prices and total
quantities (Lq(c)) produced by a ﬁrm as follows:










































































































































Proposition 6 shows that when markups are interior and the cost cutoff converges, one of
three things must happen. 1) Only the lowest cost ﬁrms remain (lim
L!¥
cmkt
a = 0) and prices go








= ¥). 2) Post-entry, all ﬁrms produce independent of cost (lim
L!¥
cmkt
a = ¥) while








akin to a “rentier” case where ﬁrms produce little after ﬁxed costs are incurred. 3) The cost cutoff
converges to a positive ﬁnite level (lim
L!¥
cmkt
a 2 (0;¥)), and a non-degenerate distribution of prices
and total quantities persists. Although each of these possibilities might be of interest, we focus on
the case when the limiting cost draw distribution exhibits heterogeneity (lim
L!¥
cmkt
a > 0) but ﬁxed
costs still play a role in determining which ﬁrms produce (lim
L!¥
cmkt
a < ¥). We therefore make
the following assumption, which by Proposition 6 will guarantee non-degenerate prices and total
quantities:
16Kuhn and Vives (1999) ﬁnd that limq !01 e(q) = limq !0m(q) under relatively mild assumptions. Let n =
jV0(q)q=V(q)j where V(q) = u(q)=q in our notation. Then their assumption is that there exist positive constants r
and k such that limq!0[n(q) n(0)]=qr = k so n(q) n(0) has an asymptotic expansion at q = 0 with a leading
term of the constant elasticity type. Examples of such utility functions include u(q) = qrekq for r 2 (0;1) and
k < (1 r)=(1+r)r, u(q) = qk(1 q) for k 2 (0;1) and u(q) = q(1 qk) for k > 0.
17The expo-power utility form was proposed by Saha (1993) and recently used by Holt and Laury (2002) and Post
et al. (2008) to model risk aversion empirically.
15Assumption (Interior Convergence). In the large economy, the market and optimum allocations
have a non-degenerate cost distribution in which some but not all entrants produce.
Under interior markups and convergence, the economy converges to a “monopolistically com-
petitive” limit distinct from a “perfectly competitive” limit or at the other extreme a “rentier” limit.
As the economy grows, each worker consumes a negligible quantity of each variety. At these low
levels of quantity, the inverse demand elasticity does not vanish and ﬁrms can still extract a pos-
itive markup m. This is in sharp contrast to a competitive limit, in which ﬁrms are left with no
market power and m drops to zero. Similarly, the social markup (1 e) does not drop to zero in
the monopolistically competitive limit and each variety contributes at a positive rate to utility even
at low levels of quantity.
In fact, this monopolistically competitive limit has a sharper characterization very close to the
conditions which characterize a ﬁnite size market under CES demand (including efﬁciency). To
obtain this result, we introduce one last regularity condition.
Assumption (Market Identiﬁcation). Quantity ratios distinguish price ratios for small q:





Market identiﬁcation guarantees production levels across ﬁrms can be distinguished if the ﬁrms
charge distinct prices as quantities sold become negligible. Combining these three assumptions of
interior markups, convergence and identiﬁcation ensures the large economy goes to the monopo-
listically competitive limit, summarized as Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under the above assumptions, as market size L approaches inﬁnity the market
approaches the monopolistically competitive limit. This limit has the following characteristics:
1. Prices, markups and expected proﬁts converge to positive constants.
2. Per capita quantities q(c) go to zero, while aggregate quantities Lq(c) converge.
3. Relative quantities Lq(c)=Lq(cd) converge to (c=cd) 1=a with a = limq !0m(q).
4. The entrant per worker ratio Me=L converges.
5. The market and socially optimal allocations coincide.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 shows that integration with large markets can push economies based on VES
demand to the monopolistically competitive limit. In this limit, the inverse demand elasticity and
the elasticity of utility become constant, ensuring the market outcome is socially optimal. Firms
charge constant markups which exactly cross-subsidize entry of low productivity ﬁrms to preserve
variety. This wipes out the distortions of imperfect competition as the economy becomes large.
Intuitively, we can explain Proposition 7 in terms of our previous result that CES preferences
16induce efﬁciency. In large markets, the quantity q(c) sold to any individual consumer goes to
zero, so markups m(q(c)) converge to the same constant independent of c.18 This convergence
to constant markups aligns perfectly with those generated by CES preferences with an exponent
equal to 1 limq !0m(q). Thus, large markets reduce market distortions until they are aligned
with socially optimal objectives.
It is somewhat remarkable that the large market outcome, which remains imperfectly compet-
itive, is socially optimal. Firms charge positive markups but they exactly recover both average
costs and ex ante entry costs. Therefore, market allocations are efﬁcient despite positive markups.
Such persistence of imperfection in competition is consistent with the observation of Samuelson
(1967) that “the limit may be at an irreducible positive degree of imperfection” (Khan and Sun
2002).19 While the monopolistically competitive limit is optimal despite imperfect competition,
it is an open empirical question whether markets are sufﬁciently large for this to be a reasonable
approximation to use in lieu of richer VES demand. When integrated markets are small, variable
markups are crucial in understanding distortions. We discuss a small VES economy in the next
Section.
6 Distortions and the Impact of Integration
The previous section showed how integration with sufﬁciently large markets can improve welfare
and eliminate distortions. However, this outcome is an idealistic statement about the effects of
intense competition in an otherwise imperfectly competitive market. When competitive forces are
weaker, distortions remain despite integration. Although we have identiﬁed the source of distor-
tions as a conﬂict between private markups m(q) captured by ﬁrms and social markups 1 e(q)
that would maximize welfare, we have not detailed the nature of these distortions. In this sec-
tion we ﬁrst characterize market distortions in productivity, quantity and entry. We then show that
small increases in market size that fall short of large market integration may magnify distortions.
Although it is reasonable to expect small increases in market size to improve welfare, additional
gains can be captured using policies which mitigate distortions.
6.1 Market Distortions under VES Demand
Here we compare the market and optimal quantity, productivity and variety to understand the
nature of distortions in a VES economy. We show that distortions depend on markups m(q) and
1 e(q). Speciﬁcally, the bias in market quantity, productivity and variety is determined by how
the markups vary with quantity (m0(q) and (1 e(q))0). We start with a discussion of the relation
18The rate at which markups converge of course depends on c and is in any case highly endogenous (see Appendix).
19Stiglitz (1986) notes that the CES model violates the assumptions of the competitive limit of the monopolistically
competitive economy derived by Hart (1985) who assumes markups are completely wiped out in the limit.
17between markups and quantity, and then characterize distortions by these demand characteristics.
6.1.1 Relation between Markups and Quantity
The pattern of markups across ﬁrms in a VES economy is determined by m0 and (1 e)0. When
m0(q) > 0, markups are positively correlated with quantity. This is the case studied by Krugman
(1979): ﬁrms are able to charge higher markups when they sell higher quantities. Our regularity
conditions guarantee low cost ﬁrms produce higher quantities (Section 3.1). This means high cost
ﬁrms have both high q and high markups. When m0(q) < 0, small “boutique” ﬁrms charge higher
markups. For CES demand, markups are constant (m0 = 0). The richer VES demand brings out the
distinctionbetween m0 >0and m0 <0, whichturnsouttobeimportantincharacterizingdistortions.
The sign of (1 e(q))
0 determines how social markups vary with quantity. When it is pos-
itive (1 e(q))
0 > 0, social markups are higher at higher levels of quantity. As above, this im-
plies a negative correlation between social markups 1 e and unit costs c. Conversely, when
(1 e(q))
0 < 0, the “boutique” varieties which are consumed in small quantities provide relatively
higher social markups. Under CES preferences, the elasticity of utility is 1 e(q)=1 r implying
(1 e(q))
0 = 0.
We use the relationship between markups and quantity to characterize market distortions in an
open VES economy. To ﬁx ideas, Table 1 summarizes m0 and (1 e)0 for commonly used utility
functions. Among the forms of u(q) considered are expo-power, HARA and generalized CES
(proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz).20
Table 1: Private and Social Markups for Common Utility Forms
(1 e)





0 Generalized CES (a > 0): CARA, Quadratic

























6.2 Quantity, Productivity and Entry Distortions
We characterize the bias in market allocations compared to the optimal allocation by demand
characteristics. For ease of reference, Table 2 summarizes these biases and discussion of results
20The relevant parameter restrictions are r 2 (0;1) for each form, q=(1 r)+a > 0 for HARA and q+a > 0 for
Generalized CES.
18follows.
Table 2: Distortions by Demand Characteristics
(1 e)
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We discuss quantity, productivity and entry distortions in turn. Quantity distortions across
ﬁrms depend on whether private and social markups have the same relationship with quantity.
We will say that private and social incentives are partially aligned when m0 and (1 e)
0 have
the same sign. Conversely, incentives are misaligned when m0 and (1 e)
0 have different signs.
Proposition8showsthatwhenprivateandsocialmarkupsaremisaligned, marketquantitiesqmkt(c)
are uniformly too high or low relative to optimal quantities qopt(c). In contrast, Proposition 8
also shows that when private and social markups are partially aligned, the market under or over
produces quantity, depending on a ﬁrm’s costs.
Proposition 8. When (1 e)0 and m0 have different signs, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) never cross:
1. If m0 > 0 > (1 e)
0, market quantities are too high: qmkt(c) > qopt(c).
2. If m0 < 0 < (1 e)
0, market quantities are too low: qmkt(c) < qopt(c).
In contrast, when (1 e)0 and m0 have the same sign and infqe(q) > 0, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) have a
unique crossing c (perhaps beyond market and optimal cost cutoffs).
1. If m0 > 0 and (1 e)
0 > 0, qmkt(c) > qopt(c) for c < c and qmkt(c) < qopt(c) for c > c.
2. If m0 < 0 and (1 e)
0 < 0, qmkt(c) < qopt(c) for c < c and qmkt(c) > qopt(c) for c > c.
Proof. See Appendix.
The relationship between market and optimal quantities is ﬁxed by FOCs for revenue maxi-
mization and welfare maximization. Speciﬁcally, the market chooses [1 m(qmkt)]u0(qmkt) = dc




















When incentives are misaligned, market and optimal quantities are too high or too low across all
varieties. In particular, when m0 > 0 > (1 e)
0, all ﬁrms over-produce qmkt(c) > qopt(c). When
m0 <0<(1 e)
0, market production is too low (qmkt(c)<qopt(c)). Firms are either over-rewarded
(m0 >0) for producing q or under-rewarded (m0 <0). When incentives are aligned, the gap between







0 > 0, market production is biased towards low cost ﬁrms (qmkt > qopt for low c
and qmkt < qopt for high c). The market over-rewards low cost ﬁrms who impose an externality on
high cost ﬁrms. When m0;(1 e)
0 < 0, the bias is reversed and quantities are biased towards high
cost ﬁrms.
Proposition 8 highlights the importance of demand elasticities and ﬁrm heterogeneity for policy
scope. DixitandStiglitzﬁndthatonlytheelasticityofutilitymattersforquantitybiasandelasticity
of demand is not relevant for determining efﬁciency of market production levels. In contrast,
variable markups and ﬁrm heterogeneity fundamentally change this policy rule. Both the elasticity
of utility and the inverse demand elasticity determine the bias in market quantities. Further, the
bias varies across ﬁrms when markups are partially aligned.
The bias in productivity level is determined by the relation between social markups and quan-
tity. Proposition 9 shows that productivity in the market is either too low or high, depending on
whether social markups are increasing or decreasing. Revenue of the cutoff productivity ﬁrm is
proportional to u0(q)q while its contribution to utility is u(q). Therefore, the gap in productiv-
ity cutoffs is determined by e(q) and market bias depends on e0(q). Increasing social markups
(1 e)0 > 0 encourage higher optimal quantity at lower costs. In general equilibrium, this trans-
lates into a lower cost cutoff at the optimum so market costs are too high.
Proposition 9. Market productivity is too low or high, as follows:









Although a comparison of market entry to optimal entry is generally hard to make, Proposi-
tion 10 establishes their relative levels for the case when private and social markups are partially
aligned: market entry is too low when private markups are increasing and market entry is too high
when private markups are decreasing. When incentives are misaligned, quantity and productivity
20distortions have opposing effects on entry so the market entry bias depends on the magnitudes of
exogenous parameters.
Proposition 10. The market over or under produces varieties, as follows:









We have detailed the nature of distortions in an open VES economy. Next we show that small
increases in market size need not lower distortions. We illustrate this with the impact of a small
increase in market size on the productivity gap.
6.3 Productivity changes in the market
With variable markups, opening to trade can have positive or negative effects on productivity.
Trade expands market size and has different effects on proﬁtability across ﬁrms. We discuss these
effects and show that a small increase in market size may exacerbate the productivity gap.
In a VES economy, inverse demand is p(q(c)) = u0(q(c))=d where d is a consumer’s budget
multiplier. The multiplier d is an aggregate demand shifter that increases with market size. Dif-
ferentiating the free entry condition (FE),
R ca
0 [(p(c) c)q(c)L  f]dG = fe with respect to L and




The ﬁrst term on the LHS above is the rise in proﬁts from higher sales in a bigger market while the
second term reﬂects the shift in the residual demand curve due to market expansion. Solving for
the change in aggregate demand conditions shows







Using the fact that p(c) c = m(c) p(c), we have







As market size expands, more ﬁrms enter so residual demand of each ﬁrm falls. The percentage
fall is the average markup in the economy, and we now examine how this rise affects the ability of
the cutoff ﬁrm to survive.
21From the cutoff cost condition (ZPC), (p(ca) ca)q(ca)L = f. Differentiating with respect to
L and applying the envelope theorem, we have
(p(ca) ca)q(ca)+L(¶p(ca)=¶L dca=dL)q(ca) = 0:
The ﬁrst terms on the LHS is the rise in proﬁt from higher sales in a bigger market and the second
term is the drop in residual demand from market expansion. Rearrangement shows
¶ lnp(ca)=¶ lnL+(p(ca) ca)=p(ca) = (dlnca=dlnL)ca=p(ca): (3)








Since m(ca) 2 (0;1), dlnca=dlnL is the same sign as the RHS of Equation (4) which depends
on the markup of the cutoff ﬁrm relative to the average markup in the economy. High cost ﬁrms
produce lower quantities so q(ca) is the lowest quantity produced. Therefore, if m0(q) > 0, then
m(q(ca))  m(q(c)) for all c. Reading off from Equation (4) shows that dlnca=dlnL < 0. Con-
versely, when m0(q) < 0, the same argument shows dlnca=dlnL > 0.
The intuitive explanation is as follows. When m0(q) > 0, high productivity ﬁrms sell more q
and charge higher markups. With market expansion, the rise in competition (d) squeezes prices
and the less productive ﬁrms are the least able to cushion this price drop through markups. They
cannot survive so the cutoff cost level drops. Conversely, when m0(q) < 0, low productivity “bou-
tique” ﬁrms have higher markups. With increased competition, they lower per capita quantities
(q) but charge higher markups and sell to a bigger market. They have a cushion to survive import
competition and the cutoff cost level rises. This is consistent with Holmes and Stevens (2010) who
ﬁnd small US plants were less impacted than large plants during the import surge from China.
Under CES preferences, the inverse demand elasticity is m(q) = 1 r implying m0(q) = 0.
Therefore, the cutoff cost level is not affected by market size. The drop in residual demand from
higher competition exactly counterbalances the higher sales to a bigger market so ﬁrm decisions
are unaffected. Under VES demand, this is no longer true: the proﬁtability of the least productive
ﬁrm is affected by market size. Following market expansion from trade, productivity changes
depend on whether the markup of low productivity ﬁrms provides enough cushion to absorb the
downward shift in demand. We summarize these productivity changes in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Increases in market size (L) change the market cost cutoff (ca) as follows:
1. When private markups increase in quantity, the cutoff decreases with size.
2. When private markups decrease in quantity, the cutoff increases with size.
226.3.1 Optimal productivity changes under VES demand
In a parallel fashion to the market productivity changes, we show that social markups determine
the change in optimal productivity after trade. The argument is similar to the one for the impact













The change in the cutoff cost level depends on the social markup at the cutoff (1 e(q)) rela-
tive to the average social markup for all varieties. The sign of the RHS of Equation (5) can be
determined and interpreted in a manner similar to the change in market productivity. If the social
markup rises with quantity (1 e(q))
0 >0, social markups are higher for higher productivity ﬁrms.
Low cost ﬁrms make relatively larger contributions to welfare and the cost cutoff falls after trade.
Conversely, when (1 e(q))
0 < 0, the cutoff cost level rises with market expansion because the
“boutique” varieties which are consumed in small quantities provide relatively higher utility.
Under CES preferences, the elasticity of utility is 1 e(q) = 1 r implying (1 e(q))
0 = 0.
Constant elasticity of utility implies the optimal cost cutoff does not change with market size.
This result explains why it is not optimal to select high productivity ﬁrms in the absence of trade
frictions in an open Melitz economy.
In summary, the elasticity of utility characterizes optimal productivity changes after trade, as
in Proposition 12. When social markups increase in quantity, low productivity varieties have no
cushion against the rise in social costs because they provide lower social markups. These varieties
are closed down and the optimal cost cutoff falls. When social markups decrease in quantity, low
productivity varieties have a cushion against the rise in social costs because they provide higher
social markups. Consequently, low productivity varieties are retained and the optimal cost cutoff
rises.
Proposition 12. Increases in market size (L) change the optimal cost cutoff (ca) as follows:
1. When social markups increase in quantity, the cutoff decreases with size.
2. When social markups decrease in quantity, the cutoff increases with size.
Proof. See Supplemental Appendix.
To summarize how integration affects the gap between market and optimal allocations, Table
3 details the impact of integration on distortions by demand characteristics. Depending on the
inverse demand elasticity and the elasticity of utility, productivity distortions may be mitigated or
exacerbated for small increases in market size. Speciﬁcally, trade reduces the productivity gap
when private and social markups move in the same direction but exacerbates it when incentives are
misaligned.
23Table 3: Impact of Integration on Distortions
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Scope for complementary policy
Since the theoretical implications of this paper depend heavily on the nature of demand, in
particular through m(q) and e(q), we now turn to how the theory can inform empirical work.
7 Theoretical Insights for Empirical Strategies
This paper has so far illustrated that the underlying demand structure can have very different impli-
cations for welfare and productivity distortions. While demand estimation is beyond the scope of
this paper, we discuss observable differences that can distinguish different demand characteristics
to enable welfare analysis. This Section details these differences for empirical work and discusses
some theoretical considerations useful in designing estimation strategies.
The nature of distortions depends on how private and social markups vary with quantity. Em-
pirical work has shown that cross-sectional variation in ﬁrm markups and their responses to market
expansion can explain how private markups vary with quantity.21 Social markups are rarely ob-
servable, and there is lack of consensus on how they respond to quantity (Vives 2001). Spence
suggests social markups decrease with quantity while Dixit and Stiglitz propose increasing social
markups. Therefore, the answer to this question must rely on further investigation and we discuss
theoretical predictions that can guide this analysis. We begin with how observable implications
of VES preferences can distinguish between different types of market demand. We then move
on to distinguishing welfare properties which enables policy inference. The section concludes by
contrasting productivity and welfare changes in small versus large markets.
21The bulk of empirical work on pass-through rates and ﬁrm selection suggests private markups increase with
quantities. However, some studies also suggest markups decrease with quantities as they ﬁnd a rise in markups after
entry (see Zhelobodko et al. 2011). With direct information on prices and costs, Cunningham (2011) ﬁnds evidence
for decreasing markups among pharmaceutical products.
247.1 Directly observable features of VES demand
How markups change with quantity can be distinguished in at least three ways. First, the cost
cutoff for market survival can be directly observed from ﬁrm production data. Since increasing
private markups imply selection of low cost ﬁrms after a rise in market size (Proposition 11), a
decrease in the cost cutoff is consistent with increasing markups. Conversely, increases in the cost
cutoff following market expansion is consistent with decreasing private markups.22 We state this
relationship as Remark 1.
Remark 1. Following a rise in market size, productivity increases are consistent with increasing
private markups, while productivity decreases are consistent with decreasing private markups.
Another direct approach to distinguishing increasing and decreasing markups is estimation
using ﬁrm pricing and production data. Obviously, increasing markups imply that markups and
quantities are positively correlated (Remark 2). Since the theory implies that in a cross-section,
quantity falls as unit cost increases, increasing markups also imply markups and unit costs are
negatively correlated. The opposite correlations hold for decreasing markups.
Remark 2. Increasing private markups imply Cov(m;q)>0 and Cov(m;c)<0. Decreasing private
markups imply Cov(m;q) < 0 and Cov(m;c) > 0.
Third, ifsufﬁcientdataisavailable, themarkupfunction m(q)canbeestimatedsemi-parametrically
to allow m0(q) to vary in sign. Having obtained an estimate ˆ m(q), one can use the VES demand
structure directly. One strength of this approach is that recovering ˆ m(q) would allow recovery of
















Equation (6) shows that using data on observed markups to semi-parametrically recover m(q)=q
willallowrecoveryofe(q)=q. Thisﬁxesthedemandsystemuptotheconsumer’sbudgetmultiplier
d and identiﬁes rich productivity and welfare interrelationships as detailed in the above theory.
7.2 Indirectly observable features of VES demand
Distinguishing increasing and decreasing social markups is more challenging. For instance, we
know from the theory that increasing social markups imply it is optimal to select higher produc-
tivity ﬁrms after a rise in market size, but it is hard to say when such selection would be directly
22Recently, Mrazova and Neary (2011) show m0 > 0 also inﬂuences how ﬁrms select into different ways of serving
a market.
23This equation follows from the observation that lnu0(q) =
R q
0  (m(t)=t)dt +k for some constant k and by deﬁ-
nition u(0) = 0. The change in e is e0 = e[1 e  m]=q which can be recovered from m and e.
25observable. Furthermore, the welfare implications of a change in trade costs no longer take the
simple form provided for CES demand in Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming).24 Consequently, for
standard ﬁrm level data sets, policy inferences from productivity gains require more structure on
demand.
To determine e(q) empirically, we propose modeling VES preferences in a way which nests all
combinations of increasing and decreasing, private and social markups. This suggests using ﬂexi-
ble demand systems that leave determination of these four possibilities up to the data. However, a
preliminary question is whether any single demand system can generate all four possibilities. The
answer is afﬁrmative for the parametric speciﬁcation of Equation (7):
u(q) = aqr +bqg: (7)
The VES form of Equation (7) allows all sign combinations of e0(q) and m0(q) (shown in the
Appendix).25 This parametric approach has lower data requirements than using ﬁrm pricing and
production data semi-parametrically as suggested above.
Another approach to recovering e(q) is to directly use price and quantity data. As e(q) =
u0(q)q=u(q), we can use u(q) =
R
u0(q)dq with the initial condition u(0) = 0 to infer u(q). Multi-






To recover the area under the demand curve,
R
p(q)dq, we need to account for the fact that the
observed price-quantity distribution reﬂects the cost distribution G(c) and not the uniform quantity
distribution over which the demand curve should be integrated. For instance, at the mode of the
cost distribution, we will observe more price-quantity pairs but these observations over-represent
the demand curve at the mode, so these observations need to be appropriately weighted when
constructing a sample analog of the integral
R
p(q)dq.
One approach to recovering
R







over which the demand curve is being integrated. Then the sample analog of the elasticity of utility
24This is shown graphically in the Appendix for the VES system of Equation (7).
25When g =1, the implied demand corresponds to an adjustable pass-through demand system (Bulow and Pﬂeiderer
1983; Weyl and Fabinger 2009).
26is







This equation provides a ﬁrst pass at recovering the elasticity of utility from ﬁrm level data without
recourse to semi-parametric or non-linear methods.
Once the elasticity of utility has been recovered, we can determine whether social markups are
increasing or decreasing, and thereby compare actual productivity changes with optimal changes.
We summarize two distinguishing characteristics, parallel to how private markups can be distin-
guished, in Remark 3.
Remark 3. Increasing social markups imply Cov(1 e;q) > 0 and Cov(1 e;c) < 0. Decreasing
social markups preferences imply Cov(1 e;q) < 0 and Cov(1 e;c) > 0.
A careful empirical approach can address the magnitude of distortions and identify the impact
of integration. We now proceed to empirical suggestions for large markets.
7.3 The Role of Market Size
In small markets, differences from a CES approximation are likely to be more pronounced and the
relationship between market and optimal outcomes can be addressed by the more detailed VES
demand.
Proposition 7 shows that market allocations are efﬁcient in large markets. A theoretical insight
that may prove useful in determining how large markets need to be is the idea that markups should
tend to align across ﬁrms in large markets. Although ﬁrms continue to charge positive markups,
these markups become more uniform as the per capita quantity becomes negligible for each variety.
Therefore decreased dispersion of markups following integration is consistent with positive steps
towards the monopolistically competitive limit. We summarize this as Remark 4.
Remark 4. The monopolistically competitive limit is consistent with positive markups which be-
come more uniform with increased market size.
Another consequence of Proposition 7 is that the distribution of ﬁrm productivity is station-
ary in the limit. Thus, to explain substantial productivity changes, the most promising modeling
choice is VES demand in small markets far from the monopolistically competitive limit. Since
market allocations are not optimal in the presence of variable elasticities, this also highlights the
importance of estimating welfare and evaluating potential policies, conditional on both demand
and the productivity distribution of the economy. We leave these avenues to further research and
conclude in the next Section.
278 Conclusion
This paper examines the efﬁciency of market allocations when ﬁrms vary in productivity and
markups. Generalizing the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz framework to heterogeneous ﬁrms, the efﬁciency
of CES demand is valid even with heterogeneous ﬁrms. Firms earn positive proﬁts and charge
prices higher than their average costs. Yet market allocations are efﬁcient in both closed and open
economies, even when trade is costly.
These ﬁndings crucially depend on CES preferences which are necessary for market efﬁciency.
Generalizing to variable elasticities of substitution, ﬁrms charge heterogeneous markups which
affect the trade off between quantity, variety and productivity. The nature of market distortions
depends on the elasticity of inverse demand and the elasticity of utility. Under CES demand, these
two elasticities are constant and provide strong efﬁciency properties, but miss out on meaningful
trade offs.
Consideringvariablemarkupshighlightsthespecialroleofintegrationasapolicytooltoreduce
distortions. Integration with large markets holds out the possibility of approaching the monopo-
listically competitive limit which induces constant markups and therefore an efﬁcient outcome.
Even though integration can cause market and social objectives to perfectly align, “How Large
is Large?” is an open question. Further empirical work might quantify these relationships and
thereby exhibit the scope of integration as a tool to discipline imperfectly competitive markets.
In small markets, distortions persist even after integration. We characterize the nature of market
distortions by demand characteristics, which reveals likely targets for policy. As demand condi-
tions vary across industries, empirical work can help identify industry-speciﬁc distortions. Careful
work using ﬂexible VES demand offers a method to quantify the distortions present in imperfectly
competitive markets and gauge the potential for trade to mitigate them. Future work can provide
guidance on the design of implementable policies to realize further welfare gains from trade.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Social welfare
To assess the optimality of market allocations resulting from international trade, we need to clarify
the planner’s objective function over different international pairings between producers and con-
sumers. This is because every linkage between a producer in country j and a consumer in country i
may encounter trade frictions distinct from one another, and a planner will factor the costs of each



















31where U is each worker’s utility and wji > 0 is the Pareto weight for country i’s consumption of
goods from j.
In our setting, workers are treated identically by producers within each country. Accordingly,
we constrain the social planner to provide the same allocation to all workers within a country. We
identify each worker i with her country I and a country-wide Pareto weight wJI which weights
utility from goods produced in J. Each country has a mass LI of workers, which allows us to
aggregate within each country and write social welfare as
W = å








From Equation (10), dividing both sides by the world population shows any socially optimal al-






JIg must maximize W (otherwise a Pareto improvement is possible). Since every Pareto




, ranging over all admissible weights
fwJIg sweeps out the Pareto frontier of allocations in which there is a representative worker for
each country. Thus, any market allocation can be evaluated for Pareto efﬁciency in the usual way
using Equation (10).
A.2 A Folk Theorem
In this context we need to deﬁne the Social Planner’s policy space. Provided Me and q(c), and
assuming without loss of generality that all of q(c) is consumed, all allocations are determined.
The only question remaining is what class of q(c) the SP is allowed to choose from. A sufﬁciently
rich class for our purposes are q(c) which are positive and continuously differentiable on some
closed interval and zero otherwise. This follows from the basic principle that a SP will utilize low
cost ﬁrms before higher cost ﬁrms. Formally, we restrict q to be in sets of the form
Q[0;cd]  fq 2 C 1;> 0 on [0;cd] and 0 otherwiseg:
We maintain Melitz’s assumptions which imply a unique market equilibrium, and use the following
shorthand throughout the proofs: G(x) 
R x
0 g(c)dc, R(x) 
R x
0 cr=(r 1)g(c)dc.
Proposition. Every market equilibrium of a closed Melitz economy is socially optimal.
Proof. Assume a market equilibrium exists, which guarantees that R(c) is ﬁnite for admissible c.
First note that in both the market equilibrium and social planner’s problem, L=Me = fe+ fG(cd)
26Our speciﬁcation of social welfare is consistent with the trade agreement literature. Bagwell and Staiger (2009)
focus on equal weights as home and foreign labor are directly comparable in their model due to the presence of an
outside homogeneous good.




q(c)rg(c)dc subject to fe+ fG(cd)+L
Z cd
0
cq(c)g(c)dc = L=Me (SP)
where the maximum is taken over choices of Me; cd; q2Q[0;cd]. We will exhibit a globally optimal
q(c) for each ﬁxed (Me;cd) pair, reducing the SP problem to a choice of Me and cd. We then solve
for Me as a function of cd and ﬁnally solve for cd.








where h(c;x)  xcg(c) and v(c;x)  xrg(c). One may show thatV(q) lH(q) is strictly concave
8l.27 Now for ﬁxed (Me;cd), consider the problem of ﬁnding q given by
max
q2Q[0;cd]
V(q) subject to H(q) = L=Me  fe  fG(cd): (11)
Following Troutman (1996), if some q maximizesV(q) lH(q) on Q[0;cd] for some l and satis-
ﬁes the constraint then it is a solution to Equation (11). For any l, a sufﬁcient condition for some
q to be a global maximum on Q[0;cd] is
D2v(c;q(c)) = lD2h(c;q(c)): (12)
This follows because (12) implies for any such q, 8x s.t. q+x 2 Q[0;cd] we have dV(q;x) =
ldH(q;x) (where d denotes the Gateaux derivative in the direction of x) and q is a global max
sinceV(q) lH(q) is strictly concave. The condition (12) is nothing but rq(c)r 1g(c)=lcg(c)
which implies q(c) = (lc=r)1=(r 1).28 From above, this q serves as a solution to maxV(q)
provided that H(q) = L=Me  fe  fG(cd). This will be satisﬁed by appropriate choice of l since





so choosing l as l  r(L=Me  fe  fG(cd))
r 1=Lr 1R(cd)r 1 will make q a solution. In
summary, for each (Me;cd) a globally optimal q satisfying the resource constraint is
q(c) = c1=(r 1)(L=Me  fe  fG(cd))=LR(cd) (13)
27Since h is linear in x, H is linear and since v is strictly concave in x (using r < 1) so isV.
28By abuse of notation we allow q to be ¥ at c = 0 since reformulation of the problem omitting this single point
makes no difference to allocations or utility which are all eventually integrated.
33which must be > 0 since L=Me  fe  fG(cd) must be > 0 as discussed at the beginning.




q(c)rg(c)dc = MeL1 r[L=Me  fe  fG(cd)]rR(cd)1 r: (14)
Direct investigation yields a unique solution to the FOC of M
e(cd) = (1 r)L=(fe+ fG(cd)) and
d2W=d2Me < 0 so this solution maximizesW.
Finding cd. Finally, we have maximal welfare for each ﬁxed cd from Equation (14), explicitly
˜ W(cd)  W(M
e(cd);cd). We may rule out cd = 0 as an optimum since this yields zero utility.
Solving this expression and taking logs shows that
ln ˜ W(cd) = lnrr(1 r)1 rL2 r +(1 r)[lnR(cd) ln(fe+ fG(cd))]:
Deﬁning B(cd)  lnR(cd) ln(fe+ fG(cd)) we see that to maximize ln ˜ W(cd) we need maximize
only B(cd). In order to evaluate critical points of B, note that differentiating B and rearranging












d =¥ and limcd !¥c
r=(r 1)
d =0 while R(cd) and G(cd) are bounded, there
is a positive interval [a;b] outside of which B0(x) > 0 for x  a and B0(x) < 0 for x  b. Clearly
then we have supx2(0;a]B(x);supx2[b;¥)B(x) < supx2[a;b]B(x) and therefore any global maximum
of B must occur in (a;b). Since B is continuously differentiable, at least one maximum exists
in [a;b] and all maxima must occur at critical points of B. From Equation (15), B0(cd) = 0 iff
R(cd)=c
r=(r 1)
d  G(cd) = fe=f. Now for cd that satisfy B0(cd) = 0, M
e and q are determined and
inspection shows the entire system corresponds to the conditions for market allocation. Therefore
B has a unique critical point, which therefore is a global maximum of B, and therefore maximizes
welfare.
A.3 Melitz Open Economy
Proposition. Every market equilibrium of identical open Melitz economies is socially optimal.
Proof. Following the discussion of social welfare in the text, we will show that the market alloca-






















r g(c)dc. As laid out
in the deﬁnition of social welfare, these j and i are representative, and the optimal allocation is








. Since labor is not
mobile and resources are symmetric (Lj = L for all j), one can maximize W by considering the





Since U is increasing (if every element of a product vector Q0 is strictly greater than a product





that maximizes W1 is characterized
exactly by simultaneously being on the Pareto frontier while U(Q1i)=U(Q1j) = w1i=w1j. Since
Equation (16) is difﬁcult to deal with directly, we will now maximize an additive social welfare
function W 1 U(Q11)+åj>1U(Q1j). This is because any allocation which maximizes W 1 must













W 1 must be maximized subject to a joint cost function C(fQ1ig) we now detail. For brevity
deﬁne the two “max” terms M  maxjfM
1j
e g and c  maxjfc
1j





 M(fe+G(c)f) which is incurred from ﬁxed costs at home. Next deﬁne “variable”















































, withCf +åLj =L, that constrainCj Lj. We may then maximize eachU(Q1j)
subject to the constraint Cj  Lj separately and we may assume WLOG that each Lj > 0.29 As
























Having found the optimal quantities of Equations (17-18) in terms of ﬁnite dimensional vari-
ables, we now prove existence of an optimal allocation. Note that for any ﬁxed pair (M;c), the
remaining choice variables are restricted to a compact set K(M;c) so that continuity of the objec-
tive function (by deﬁning U(Q1j) = 0 when Lj = 0) guarantees existence of a solution and we
29If Lj = 0 for all j then autarkic allocations are optimal, and as shown above the optimal autarkic allocation
coincides with the market. Any set of exogenous parameters which result in trade imply welfare beyond autarky, so if
countries trade in the market equilibrium, Lj = 0 for all j cannot be optimal. Inada type conditions on U(Q1j) imply
that if it is optimal to have at least one Lj > 0 then all Lj are > 0.
35denote the value of W 1 at the maximum by S(M;c). In fact, K(M;c) can be shown to be a con-
tinuous correspondence, so by the Theorem of the Maximum S(M;c) is continuous onC 1
f ([0;L])
(Berge and Karreman, 1963). SinceCf is continuous,C 1
f ([0;L]) is compact and therefore a global
max of S(M;c) exists. Therefore there is an allocation that maximizes W 1 which we now proceed
to characterize.




















Equation (19) is increasing in both M11
e and c11
d so it follows that at any optimum, M11
e = M and
c11
d = c. Equation (20) is ﬁrst increasing in M
1j
e , attains a critical point at (1 r)Lj=fxG(c
1j
d )
































d <c implies M
1j
e =M and M
1j
e <M implies c
1j



















d = c cannot be optimal. Therefore we conclude that M
1j
e = M and c
1j
d < c. In particular,
c
1j











d ) = (1 r)Lj=Mfx (21)
derived from the ﬁrst order necessary condition.

























by c for j > 1. Using a standard Lagrangian approach, the candidate solution from the necessary
conditions implies c
1j
d = (fx=f)(r 1)=r ¯ c=t and since it is assumed (f=fx)(1 r)=r < t for trade
in a market equilibrium in the Melitz framework, c
1j
d < c. The candidate solution with c
1j
d un-
constrained also yields Equation (21) so the unconstrained candidate solution coincides with the
solution including the omitted constraints c
1j
d < c. We conclude the necessary conditions em-
bodied in the candidate solution are also necessary to maximize W 1 with constraints. Since these
necessaryconditionsareexactlythosewhichﬁxtheuniquemarketallocation, themarketallocation
36maximizes W 1.
A.4 Results Regarding the Impact of Large Markets
Lemma. As market size becomes large:
1. Under the market, revenue is increasing in market size and goes to inﬁnity.
2. Under the optimum, utility per capita is increasing in market size and goes to inﬁnity.
3. Market entry goes to inﬁnity.














0 u0(q(c))q(c)dGbetherevenuepercapitaunderthemarketallocation. FixL and
let fq(c);cd;Meg denote the market allocation with L resources. Consider an increased resource
level ˜ L >L with allocation
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q(c)  ! 0 for all c > 0 and
limq !0u0(q) = ¥, revenue per capita goes to inﬁnity as ˜ L  ! ¥. A similar argument holds for
the social optimum.
First note that q(c) is ﬁxed by u0(q(c))[1 m(q(c))] = dc, and d  ! ¥ and m(q(c)) is
bounded, it must be that u0(q(c))  ! ¥ for c > 0. This requires q(c)  ! 0 for c > 0. Since
revenue u0(q(c))q(c) is equal to e(q(c))u(q(c)) and e is bounded, revenue also goes to zero for
each c > 0. Revenue is also decreasing in d for every c, so we can bound revenue with a function
B(c). In particular, for any ﬁxed market size ˜ L and implied allocation

˜ q(c); ˜ cd; ˜ Me
	
, for L  ˜ L:
u0(q(c))q(c)1[0;cd](c)  u0(˜ q(c)) ˜ q(c)1[0;˜ cd](c)+u0(˜ q(˜ cd)) ˜ q(˜ cd)1[˜ cd;¥](c)  B(c) (23)
where we appeal to the fact that q(c) is decreasing in c for any market size. Since for any L,
R cd









0 limL !¥u0(q(c))q(c)dG = 0 by dominated convergence. Therefore limL !¥d=Me = 0 which
with d  ! ¥ shows Me  ! ¥. The optimal allocation case is similar.
Lemma. For all market sizes and all positive marginal cost (c > 0) ﬁrms:
371. Proﬁts (p(c)) and social proﬁts (v(c)  (1 e(c))=e(c)cq(c)L  f) are bounded.
2. Total quantities (Lq(c)) in the market and optimal allocation are bounded.
Proof. For any costs cL < cH, q(cH) is in the choice set of a ﬁrm with costs cL and therefore
p(cL)  (p(cH) cL)q(cH)L  f = p(cH)+(cH  cL)q(cH)L: (24)




0 p(c)dG = Fe and limsup
L!¥
p(c) = ¥ would imply limsup
L!¥
R cd
0 p(c)dG = ¥. It
follows from Equation (24) that Lq(c) is bounded. Substituting v for p leads to similar arguments
for the social optimum.









































































































































Proof. Note the following zero proﬁt relationships that hold at the cost cutoff ca, suppressing the
market superscripts throughout we have:
u0(q(ca))=d   f=[Lq(ca)m q(ca)=(1 m q(ca))] = ca; (25)
Lcaq(ca)m q(ca)=(1 m q(ca)) = f: (26)
First, if lim
L!¥
Lq(ca) = 0, Equation (26) implies ca  m q(ca)=(1 m q(ca))  ! ¥. Clearly
q(ca)  ! 0 and since lim
q!0
m(q) 2 (0;1), m q(ca)=(1 m q(ca)) is bounded, and therefore
ca  ! ¥. Now suppose ca  ! ¥ and since ca  u0(q(ca))=d, u0(q(ca))=d  ! ¥. Finally,
if u0(q(ca))=d  ! ¥, since d  ! ¥, necessarily q(ca)  ! 0 so m q(ca)=(1 m q(ca)) is
bounded. It follows from Equation (26) that Lcaq(ca) is bounded, so from Equation (25), Lq(ca)






Therefore from Equation (26), ca  ! 0. Now assume ca  ! 0 so from Equation (26), Lq(ca)m 
q(ca)=(1 m q(ca))  ! ¥ which implies with Equation (25) that u0(q(ca))=d  ! 0. Finally,
if u0(q(ca))=d  ! 0, Equation (25) shows ca  ! 0.
The second set of equivalencies follows from examining the conditions for a ﬁrm at the limiting
cost cutoff c¥
a 2 (0;¥). The argument for the optimal allocation is similar.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence. Then as market size grows large:
1. In the market, p(c) converges in (0;¥) for c > 0 and Lq(cd) converges in (0;¥).
2. In the optimum, uq(c)=lq(c) converges in (0;¥) for c > 0, Lq(cd) converges in (0;¥).
Proof. Since q(c)  ! 0 for all c > 0, lim
q!0
m(q) 2 (0;1) shows lim
L!¥
p(c) aligns with constant
markups and thus converges for all c>0. In particular, p(cd) converges and L(p(cd) cd)q(cd)=
f so it follows Lq(cd) converges. Similar arguments hold for the social optimum.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence and large market identiﬁcation. Then for the market and
social optimum, Lq(c) converges for c > 0.
Proof. Fix any c > 0 and ﬁrst note that for both the market and social planner, q(c)=q(cd) =
Lq(c)=Lq(cd) and both Lq(c) and Lq(cd) are bounded, so q(c)=q(cd) is bounded.
Now consider the market. q(c)=q(cd)  1 has at least one limit point and if it has two limit
points, say a and b with a < b, there exist subsequences (q(c)=q(cd))an ! a and (q(c)=q(cd))bn !
b. There also exist distinct k and ˜ k in (a;b) so that eventually
(q(c))an < kq(cd)an < ˜ kq(cd)bn < (q(c))bn:




































where we have used the fact that lim
q!0
m(q) 2 (0;1), however by assumption this contradicts a < b.
39For the social optimum, we could repeat this argument (substituting e 6= 0 for u00 < 0 where
appropriate) so long as







u0(q) = ¥ and lim
q!0
e 2 (0;¥) it follows that lim
q!0





u0(kq)=u0(q) for all k so the condition (27) in holds because





Lemma. At extreme quantities, social and private markups align as follows:
1. If lim
q!0






q!¥1 e(q) < 1 then lim
q!¥1 e(q) = lim
q!¥m(q).
Proof. By assumption, lim
q!0






















which gives the ﬁrst part of the result. Identical steps for q  ! ¥ give the second part.
Lemma. Assume interior convergence and large market identiﬁcation. As market size grows large
1. q(c)=q(cd)  ! (c=cd) 1=a with a = lim
q!0
m(q).
2. The cost cutoffs for the social optimum and market converge to the same value.
3. The entrant per worker ratios Me=L converge to the same value.




We will show in fact that ¡(c=cd) = (c=cd) a. It follows from the deﬁnition that ¡ is weakly
decreasing, and the results above show ¡ is one to one, so it is strictly decreasing. Deﬁne fq(z) 
u0(zq)=u0(q) so lim
q!0
fq(z) = ¡ 1(z) for all ¡ 1(z) 2 (0;1). Note
f0









On any strictly positive closed interval I, m and u0(zq)=zu0(q) are monotone in z so f0
q(z) converges




q(z) = d lim
q !0
fq(z)=dz =  m¥¡ 1(z)=z = d¡ 1(z)=dz: (28)
We conclude that ¡ 1(z) is differentiable and thus continuous, and given the form deduced in (28),
¡ 1(z) is continuously differentiable. Since d¡ 1(z)=dz = 1=¡0 ¡ 1(z), composing both sides






¥ be the limiting cost cutoffs as L  ! ¥ for at the social optimum and
market, respectively. Letting qopt(c); qmkt(c) denote the socially optimal and market quantities,










































































Using Equation (29), we see that Lqopt(c) and Lqmkt(c) converge uniformly on any strictly positive




1 e(q), we see from Equation (30)




























41Noting f (1 m¥)=m¥ = Lcmkt
¥ qmkt(cmkt




















































dG, we see that h0(w) =
R w
0 (1=a  1)c1 1=aw1=a 2dG and
since a = m¥ 2 (0;1), h0 > 0. Since h is strictly increasing, there is a unique c
opt




¥ such that Equation (31) holds. Checking the conditions for L=Me show they coincide between
the market and social optimum as well.
A.5 Static Distortion Results
Lemma. For sufﬁciently high ﬁxed costs, the quantities produced by all ﬁrms are close to the
maximum quantity produced (q(0)).
Proof. To clarify, we wish to show for sufﬁciently high f, for any producing ﬁrm with cost c  ca,
either jq(0) q(c)j is arbitrarily small in the case that q(0) is ﬁnite, otherwise when q(0) = ¥,
q(c) grows large. For both of these cases, we need only consider the impact of f on q(ca) since
our assumptions imply it is the lowest quantity produced and the quantity q(0) is unaffected by f
in the market or social optimum. Furthermore, both cases hold iff as f  ! ¥, dca  ! 0 because
(considering the market case, similar to the optimum case) we have
u0(q(ca))[1 m(q(ca))] = dca
and the LHS is marginal revenue which is decreasing in quantity. Since d is also equal to marginal
revenue per capita which by above is maximized by the market, d is decreasing in f. Direct com-
parative statics also show that ca is decreasing in f. Therefore if either d or ca  ! 0 we are done
and WLOG both d and ca are bounded away from 0 (at least on a subsequence, which monotonic-
ity forces to be true on the whole sequence). In particular, dd=d f =  dG(ca)Me=L and since
d  0, necessarily dd=d f  ! 0 which implies Me  ! 0. Finally, d = Me
R ca
0 u0(q(c))q(c)dG and
as d is bounded away from zero and Me  ! 0, we conclude
R ca
0 u0(q(c))q(c)dG  ! ¥. Noting
that u0(q(c))q(c) = e(q(c))u(q(c)), since ca is bounded away from zero and G is a probability
distribution,
R ca
0 u0(q(c))q(c)dG  ! ¥ implies q(c)  ! q(0) for c 2 [0;k] for some k > 0. How-
ever this contradicts dc bounded away from zero as u0(q(c))[1 m(q(c))] = dc. We conclude at
42least one of d or cd  ! 0, giving the result.
Proposition. Market productivity is too low or high, as follows:








Proof. Fora 2[0;1], deﬁneva(q)au0(q)q+(1 a)u(q)andalsodeﬁnew(q)u0(q)q u(q)













Let the Lagrange multiplier associated with each a in Equation (32) be written as b (a). By
appealing to the envelope theorem and differentiating Equation (32) in Me we have b (a) =
Me
R cd





conditions characterizing the solution to every optimum also imply
b (a) = va (q(cd))=(cdq(cd)+ f=L)
, whereby we arrive at




so cancellation and rearrangement, using the expressions for b, db=da above shows












We conclude that dcd=da ? 0 when w(q(cd))
R cd
0 va (q(c))dG ? va (q(cd))
R cd
0 w(q(c))dG: Ex-



























since q(c) is strictly decreasing in c, we see dcd=da ? 0 when e0 7 0. Note that Equation (32)
showsa =0correspondstothesocialoptimumwhilea =1correspondstothemarketequilibrium.
It follows that when e0 < 0 that dcd=da > 0 so we have cmkt
d > c
opt
d and vice versa for e0 > 0.
Proposition. When (1 e)0 and m0 have different signs, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) never cross:
1. If m0 > 0 > (1 e)
0, market quantities are too high: qmkt(c) > qopt(c).
2. If m0 < 0 < (1 e)
0, market quantities are too low: qmkt(c) < qopt(c).
In contrast, when (1 e)0 and m0 have the same sign and infqe(q) > 0, qmkt(c) and qopt(c) have a
unique crossing c (perhaps beyond market and optimal cost cutoffs).
1. If m0 > 0 and (1 e)
0 > 0, qmkt(c) > qopt(c) for c < c and qmkt(c) < qopt(c) for c > c.
2. If m0 < 0 and (1 e)
0 < 0, qmkt(c) < qopt(c) for c < c and qmkt(c) > qopt(c) for c > c.



























































dG > d=s. A similar











=d = c; u0 
qopt(c)

=l = c: (35)














Suppose m0 > 0 > (1 e)







 s, since then Equa-
tions (33) and (36) show that u0 
qmkt(c)

< u0(qopt(c)) which implies qmkt(c) > qopt(c). Since
m0 > 0 > (1 e)
0 and by assumption lim
c!0














44Similarly, if m0 < 0 < (1 e)







 s, implying from Equa-
tions (33) and (36) that qmkt(c) < qopt(c).
Nowconsiderthecaseswhen m0 ande0 havedifferentsigns, andsinceinfqe(q)>0, fromabove
in both cases it holds that infq>01 m(q) = infq>0e(q) and supq>01 m(q) = supq>0e(q). The
arguments above have shown that supq>0e(q) > d=l > infq>0e(q) and therefore











u0(qopt(c)) so qmkt(c) = qopt(c). Furthermore, qmkt(c) is strictly decreasing in c so with m0 6= 0,
c is unique. Returning to Equation (36), using the fact that qmkt(c) is strictly decreasing in c also
shows the relative magnitudes of qmkt(c) and qopt(c) for c 6= c.
Proposition. The market over or under produces varieties, as follows:








Proof. For any preferences v, deﬁning ev(q)  v0(q)q=v(q) and mv(q)   v00(q)q=v0(q) it holds













Equation (37) can be considerably simpliﬁed using two relationships. The ﬁrst is
1 e0
v(q(c))q(c)=ev(q(c)) = ev(q(c))+mv(q(c)):
The second is that manipulating the necessary conditions shows that dq(c)=dc =  (q(c)=c)
(1=mv(q(c))). Substituting these relationships into Equation (37) yields
B0
v(c) = q(c)=ev(q(c))[1 [ev(q(c))+mv(q(c))]=mv(q(c))] =  q(c)=mv(q(c)):
Now consider that the social planner problem corresponds to v(q) = u(q) while the market al-
























































Now assume e0 < 0 < m0, so by above cmkt
d > c
opt
d and for the result, from Equation (38) it is




0 Bu(c) Bu0q(c)dG(c)  0. From above, there is also a c such that
qmkt(c) > qopt(c) for c < c and qmkt(c) < qopt(c) for c > c. For c < c, Bu(c) Bu0q(c) < 0 as























































Bu0q(c)dG(c)0 giving the result. For the case e0 >0> m0, the same argument goes through since
clearly m0(q)q=m(q)  1.
A.6 VES Speciﬁc Utility
The VES demand system implied by u(q) = aqr +bqg can generate all four combinations of
increasing and decreasing, private and social markups as we now brieﬂy discuss. First, note that









For r = g, e0(q) = m0(q) = 0 and we are in a CES economy. For r 6= g, sign e0(q) = sign ab and
sign m0(q) = sign  abrg, exhibiting all four combinations for appropriate parameter values. In
addition, this demand system does not exhibit the log-linear relationship between welfare and share
of expenditure on home goods discussed in Arkolakis et al. (forthcoming), as shown in Figure 1
46for u(q) = q1=2+q1=4.
Figure 1: Welfare and Share of Home Expenditure as Home Tariff Increases
B Online Appendix
B.1 VES Market Allocation
Proposition. The market equilibrium, when unique, maximizes aggregate real revenue in the econ-











Proof. Consider a social planner who faces a utility function v(q)u0(q)q. Provided v(q) satisﬁes
the regularity conditions used in the proof of optimality, it follows that the following conditions
characterize the unique constrained maximum of LMe
R cd
0 u0(q(c))q(c)dG, where d denotes the
Lagrange multiplier:
u00(q(c))q(c)+u0(q(c)) = dc;















Comparing these conditions, we see that if d is the same as under the market allocation, the ﬁrst
three equations respectively determine each ﬁrm’s optimal quantity choice, the ex post cost cutoff,
47and the zero proﬁt condition while the fourth is the resource constraint and must hold under the
market allocation. Therefore if this system has a unique solution, the market allocation maximizes
LMe
R cd
0 u0(q(c))q(c)dG. Since these conditions completely characterize every market equilib-
rium, the assumed uniqueness of the market equilibrium guarantees such a unique solution.
B.2 VES Utility
Proposition. Increases in market size (L) change the optimal cost cutoff (ca) as follows: When
(1 e(q))0 >0, the cost cutoff decreases with size. When (1 e(q))0 <0, the cost cutoff increases
with size.







The social planner maximizes Me
R ca
0 u(q(c))dG+lR where l is the shadow value of an extra unit
of resources. The optimality conditions for the three outcomes of quantity, mass of varieties and
cost cutoff determine the optimal allocations along with the resource constraint R = 0.




l (1 R)=Me = l=Me: The FOC for the optimal cost cutoff shows that the welfare contribution of
the marginal variety is equal to its per capita shadow cost, u(q(ca)) = l (caq(ca)+ f=L).




(dq(ca)=dL) (caq(ca)+ f=L)(dl=dL) lq(ca)(dca=dL)+l f=L2 = 0:
Substituting for u0(q(c)) = lc and multiplying through by L=l, we have
(caq(ca)+ f=L)(dlnl=dlnL)+caq(ca)(dlnca=dlnL) = f=L: (39)
Equation (39) shows dca=dL is tied to dl=dL. Changes in the cost cutoff depend on how the
shadow value of labor changes with market size, namely dl=dL. Differentiating the Me FOC wrt






The binding resource constraint shows 0=d(1 R)=dL and substituting for Equation (40) implies
dlnl=dlnL Me(G(ca)f=L+ fe=L) = 0: The shadow value of labor rises with market size and
48the percentage rise in l reﬂects the better amortization of ﬁxed and sunk costs in bigger markets.
Using the expression for R = 0, we have dlnl=dlnL = 1 Me
R ca
0 cq(c)dG. Substituting this into
Equation (39) and rearranging gives
















where the second line follows from u0(q(c)) = lc and the Me FOC. Substituting for the elasticity
of utility e  qu0(q)=u(q), we have Equation (5).
B.3 Large Market Results
Lemma. Integration will select a few highly productive ﬁrms for the market and social optimum
under the following conditions:
1. If limq !0m(q) = 0 then cmkt
d  ! 0 as L  ! ¥.
2. If limq !01 e(q) = 0 then c
opt
d  ! 0 and cmkt
d  ! 0 as L  ! ¥.
Proof. Considering the market case, by above for each ﬁxed c > 0, Lq(c) and p(c) are bounded
in L. Since p(c) = Lm(q(c))=(1 m(q(c)))cq(c), and m(q(c))=(1 m(q(c)))  ! 0 (because
necessarily q(c)  ! 0), p(c)  ! 0 as L  ! ¥ so c¥
d < c for each c > 0, implying cmkt
d  ! 0.
The case for the social optimum is similar, with the addition that limq !01 e(q) < 1 implies
limq !0m(q) = 0, giving the result.
B.4 Trade and Market Size
Proposition. In the absence of trade costs, trade between countries with identical VES demand
and with sizes L1;:::;Ln has the same market outcome as a uniﬁed market of size L = L1+:::+Ln.
Proof. Consider a home country of size L opening to trade with a foreign country of size L.
Suppose the consumer’s budget multipliers are equal in each economy so d =d and that the terms
of trade are unity. We will show that the implied allocation can be supported by a set of prices and
therefore constitutes a market equilibrium. The implied quantity allocation and productivity level
is symmetric across home and foreign consumers while entry so opening to trade is equivalent to
an increase in market size from L to L+L.










49and by assumption e=e =1. Then the MR=MC condition implies a home ﬁrm chooses p(c)[1 
m(q(c))] = c in the home market and e px(c)[1 m(qx(c))] = c in the foreign market. A foreign
ﬁrm chooses e p(c)[1 m(q(c))] = c in the foreign market and p
x(c)[1 m(q
x(c))] = c in the
home market. When d = d and e = e = 1, quantity allocations and prices are identical, i.e.
q(c) = q
x(c) = q(c) = qx(c) and p(c) = p
x(c) = p(c) = px(c).
This implies cost cutoffs are also the same across countries. The cost cutoff condition for home
ﬁrms is p +epx = (p(ca) ca)q(ca)L+e(px(ca) ca)qx(ca)L = f. Substituting for optimal q
and q
x in the analogous foreign cost cutoff condition implies ca =c
a. From the resource constraint,




e. Thus, d = d and e = e = 1 completely determines the behavior of ﬁrms. What
remains is to check that d = d and e = e = 1 is consistent with the consumer’s problem and the
balance of trade at these prices and quantities consistent with ﬁrm behavior.








from L=Me = L=M














Therefore to show the consumer’s problem is consistent, it is sufﬁcient to show the expenditure




0 pxqxdG), which indeed
holds by the above equalities of prices and quantities. To show the balance of trade is consistent,











Similarly, the implied foreign terms of trade is e = 1. Thus d = d and e = e = 1 generate an
allocation consistent with monopolistic competition and price system consistent with consumer
maximization and free trade.
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